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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
AND DESCRIBING THE NATURE OF THE
PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah, U.C.A,,
§78-2-2 (1953, as amended); Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah
Supreme Court; and Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Provo City Corporation (Provo City) and Christensen &
Griffith Construction Company (Christensen) sued the State of
Utah, by and

through

its

Department

of Transportation

(the

State), and Staker Paving & Construction Company (Staker) for
alleged damages arising out of the State's diking project along
Interstate 15 in 1984.

The State and Staker filed motions for

summary judgment.

The State's motion was granted, and Stakerfs

motion was denied.

The trial court certified the order granting

the State's motion for summary judgment as final pursuant to
Rule 54(b).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Was

the

lower

court

correct

in

granting

the

State's motion for summary judgment as to Christensen's complaint based on the doctrine of governmental immunity as provided in U.C.A. §63-30-3?
2.

Was

the

lower

court

correct

in

granting

the

State's motion for summary judgment as to Staker's cross-claim
for contribution and indemnity?
-1-

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Annotated §63-30-3—Immunity of Governmental
Entities From Suit.
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune
from suit for any injury which results from
the exercise of a governmental function,
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home,
or other governmental health care facility,
and from an approved medical, nursing, or
other professional health care clinical
training program conducted in either public
or private facilities.
The management of flood waters and other
natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered
to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees
are immune from suit for any injury or damage
resulting from those activities.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE:
Provo

City

and

Christensen

filed

suit against the

State and Staker seeking to recover damages resulting from defendants' alleged failure to remove coffer dams which had been
installed in connection with the State's diking project during
1984 along 1-15 just south of Provo.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:
The State and Staker filed separate motions for sum-

mary judgment.

Staker's motion was denied, and the State's

motion was granted as to plaintiffs' claims and Staker's cross-2-

claim for contribution and indemnity.

The order granting the

State1s motion for summary judgment was certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b).
perfected

Provo City, Christensen, and Staker all

timely appeals.

Since its appeal was filed, Provo

City has settled with Staker and the State.

Provo City's appeal

has been dismissed, and it is no longer a party to this appeal.
C.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW:
The trial court granted the State's motion for summary

judgment and certified the order granting that motion as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b).
D.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
1.

In 1983 and 1984, Utah experienced some of the

worst flooding of its history.

In 1983, the level of Utah Lake

increased substantially beyond its historic high point.

Utah

Lake was expected to reach in 1984 the same high level reached
in 1983 (Earl Kemp depo. p. 45).
2.

In

1983 and

1984, rising waters of Utah Lake

threatened Interstate 15 just south of Provo.

In response to

the threat of flooding and in order to prevent it, the State
formulated a project called the Utah Lake Dike Project (the dike
project).

The dike project consisted of placing a dike on ei-

ther side of 1-15 from just south of the Ironton Connection to
north of the University Avenue overpass.

Staker was the suc-

cessful bidder on the project and was awarded the contract to
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construct the dikes on either side of 1-15.
tracted

Staker subcon-

some of the work to third-party defendants Gallegos

Construction Company and Hikiau Construction Company, neither of
which is a party to this appeal

(R., p. 484, John D. Keyes

depo., pp. 4, 5, 54, and 55 (hereafter Keyes depo.); R., pp.
292-331; Wilson depo., pp. 3-5).
3.

Several waterways located in the area of the dike

project carry water from the mountains on the east of 1-15 to
Utah Lake on the west.

Since 1-15 runs north and south between

the mountains and Utah Lake, it acts as a dam keeping water from
following

its natural

drainage

course.

When

1-15

was con-

structed, several water-carrying conduits were created under I15 to allow the water to follow its natural drainage course from
the mountains on the east to Utah Lake on the west.
dike

project

consisted

of extending

some

of

Part of the

those

conduits

through the dikes, which were placed on either side of 1-15, so
that the water could continue to flow through the conduits to
Utah Lake.

The conduits which were extended as part of the dike

project were two 10f x 5f concrete box culverts and two corrugated metal pipes, one 36" and the other 60" in diameter (Keyes
depo., pp. 6, 8, and 10; Kemp depo., pp. 20-26 and 108-110).
4.

The process of extending the culverts and pipes

involved building an earthen wall, referred to as a coffer dam,
around each end of the culvert or pipe.

The water trapped be-

tween the two coffer dams was then pumped out to create a dry
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area for making the extensions on either end of the conduit.
With the coffer dams in place, the flow of water from east to
west through that conduit was temporarily impeded.

Once the

extensions of the culvert or pipe were completed, the coffer
dams were then removed to allow the water once again to flow
through the extended conduit to Utah Lake (Keyes depo., pp. 11,
12, and 25).
5.

At approximately

the

same

time that the dike

project was taking place, Provo City was engaged in a project to
expand its municipal golf course (the golf course project) located just east of 1-15 in the area of the dike project.

The

plans for the golf course project were completed in November
1983.

Provo City solicited competitive bids on the golf course

project which were opened on February 17, 1984.

The successful

bidder was plaintiff Christensen & Griffith Construction Company, who was awarded the contract by Provo City (Kemp depo., pp.
32, 33, 130 and 131; Exhibit "5" to Kemp depo., p.7; R., p. 483;
Gary

Melvin

Griffith

depo., pp.

6 and

17

(hereafter

Gary

Griffith depo. )) .
6.

Those who prepared the plans for the golf course

project knew that 1983 had been a very wet year and that the
level of Utah Lake had increased substantially beyond its historic high point.

They were aware of the State's dike project

to keep 1—15 from being flooded.

They estimated that in 1984,

Utah Lake would reach a level of 4,495f, the same high water
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mark

reached

in

1983 -

The plans on the golf course project

contained information indicating that the level of Utah Lake was
expected

to rise during

the summer of 1984 to 4,495f.

plans were made available

Those

to all bidders on the golf course

project, including Christensen.

Information regarding the ex-

pected high water level of Utah Lake was included in the plans
so that bidders on the project would know what kind of conditions they could expect to encounter and so that they would be
able to make a fair bid which would take all conditions into
account

(Kemp depo., pp. 32, 34, 35, 39-41, 44-46, and

142;

Exhibit "1" to Kemp depo., pp. 2 and 7; Gary Griffith depo., p.
6).
7.

Prior

to

the

bid

openings

on

the

golf

course

project, the engineers on the project made the contractors aware
that Utah Lake was expected to reach a level of 4,495f in 1984,
that the peak would occur about Memorial Day, and that the lake
would stay at that high level for about two and one-half weeks
(Kemp depo., pp. 47, 48, 51, 52, and 67).
8.

Prior

to

bidding

on

the

golf

course

project,

Christensen had been told that the water of Utah Lake would rise
to a high point of about 4,495* and that the high point would
last until early to mid-June.

Christensen expected the water to

rise to that high level and assumed that there would be naturally-produced

flood

conditions

until

sometime

in

June.

Christensen took the high water situation into account in making
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its bid on the golf course project (Gary Griffith depo., pp. 8,
9, 40, 41 and 45) .
9.

On March 29, 1984, the amendment to Utah Code

Anno. §63-30-3, part of the Utah Governmental
became effective.

Immunity Act,

That amendment added the following paragraph

to §63-30-3:
The management of flood waters and other
natural disasters in the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered
to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury
or damage resulting from those activities.
10.

Work on the dike project began in March 1984.

The first time that the flow of water from east to west through
any of the conduits was impeded by coffer dams was March 19,
1984, when coffer dams were placed around the ends of one of the
concrete box culverts.

No other conduit was blocked off until

March 30, 1984, when the 60" corrugated pipe was blocked off
(Keyes depo., pp. 12, 13, 29-31, 35, and 37).
11.

Even with the coffer dams in place, as of April

1984, the water level on the east side of 1-15 was only 1/10f
higher than the water level on the west side.

The water level

on the east side remained within 1 /10f of the level on the west
side until the first part of May 1984.

Even before the dike

project, the water level on the east side of 1-15 had normally
and historically been 1 /10f higher than the level on the west
side.

The water level on the east side did not reach the level
-7-

of 4,495f until mid-May 1984 (Kemp depo., pp. 91, 92, 110, 160161; Exhibits

tf ff

3

and "20" to Kemp depo; R., p. 485, Walter C.

Rowley depo., pp. 16-17 (hereafter Rowley depo.)).
12.

Christensen began construction on the golf course

project in March

1984, sometime after March 12.

Christensen

experienced no unusual problems with the golf course construction until the middle of the summer, approximately June or July
1984.

About that time, Christensen began experiencing what it

considered to be an artificially high water level which impeded
its work.

The excessively high water level continued until

approximately mid-September 1984, when coffer dams were allegedly found to be still in place on the west side of 1-15 and were
subsequently removed.

Even after the artificially high water

level on the east side had lowered, the east side water level
was only 1 /10f

higher than the west side water level (R., p.

482, David Gary Griffith depo., pp. 5, 16-19, and 28-32; Gary
Griffith depo., pp. 18-20; Kemp depo., pp. 110; Exhibit "2" to
Kemp depo.) .
13.

Christensen's

complaint

seeks

damages

stemming

from the artificially high water level on the east side of 1-15
during the summer of 1984.

Christensen claims that the State

negligently failed to remove the coffer dams and that the failure to remove the coffer dams resulted in the artificially high
water level on the east side of 1-15.

Christensen alleges that

the artificially high water level impeded the golf course proj-
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ect, necessitating extensive diking, road building, and re-doing
of work which otherwise would not have been required (R., p. 2,
1[s 5 and 7, p. 245, 1(6, and pp. 214-217; Kemp depo., pp. 96101).
14.

Staker filed nothing in opposition to the State's

motion for summary judgment as to Staker's cross-claim for contribution and indemnity.

The lower court decided the State's

motion for summary judgment without oral argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The 1984 amendment to §63-30-3 constitutes a with-

drawal by the Legislature of its consent to the bringing of
suits against governmental entities for injury resulting from
the management

of flood

waters and other natural disasters.

That immunity is not subject to the exceptions contained in §6330-5 through §63-30-10.
2.

Christensen's arguments concerning the impairment

of the obligation of contracts, violation of the due process
clause, and taking of property without just compensation have
been raised for the first time on appeal and should not be considered by this Court.
3.

The

1984 amendment

does not affect

rights and

liabilities between Provo City and Christensen, and does not,
therefore, impair the obligation of the contract between Provo
City and Christensen.
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4.

The State's alleged failure to remove the coffer

dams resulting in damage to Christensen does not constitute a
deprivation of property without due process.

Such a result

would be contrary to the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

Likewise, the State's alleged

failure to

remove the coffer dams does not constitute a taking of property
without just compensation.
5.

Christensen has failed to raise any genuine issue

of material fact which would preclude summary judgment in favor
of the State.
6.

Staker

failed

to

raise

any

opposition

to the

State's motion for summary judgment as to Staker's cross-claim,
and Staker's argument in that regard should not be considered.
Even if Staker's argument is considered, the exception to governmental immunity for equitable claims should be limited to
those situations where a governmental entity is attempting to
derive some benefit it is not entitled to.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATE IS IMMUNE FROM CHRISTENSEN1S
SUIT PURSUANT TO U.C.A. §63-30-3
In 1984, the Utah Legislature amended §63-30-3 of the
Utah Governmental

Immunity

Act (the Act) to add a provision

relating to the management of flood waters and other natural
disasters.

The lower court interpreted that provision as pro-
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viding immunity to the State from plaintiffs1 suit and granted
the Statefs motion for summary judgment based on §63-30-3, as
amended •

Christensen argues that the lower court's interpreta-

tion of that provision was incorrect and that immunity has been
waived pursuant to §63-30-8, §63-30-9, and §63-30-10,

A careful

examination of the 1984 amendment to §63-30-3 will reveal the
fallacy of Christensen1s argument and the correctness of the
lower court's determination that §63-30-3 grants the State immunity from Christensen1s suit.
Prior to 1966, the doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity was a well-settled principle of Utah common law.
In

1966, the Utah Legislature enacted

Immunity

Act, U.C.A.

the Utah Governmental

§63-30-1, jet_. seq. , which codified and

reaffirmed governmental immunity "for any injury which results
from the exercise of a governmental function."
1.

U.C.A. §63-30-

See, generally, Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 629 (Utah

1983).
The statutory structure established by the Legislature
in the Act is such that immunity from suit is preserved for any
injury resulting from the exercise of a governmental function,
except where the Legislature has explicitly waived immunity.
The applicable language of the Act is as follows:
Except as may be otherwise provided in this
chapter, all governmental entities are immune
from suit for any injury which results from
the exercise of a governmental function....
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The "except as may be otherwise provided" language refers to the
specific waivers of immunity contained in §63-30-5 through §6330-10.
These waivers of immunity allowing suit against the
State are purely statutory and exist only because the Legislature has given its consent to the bringing of suits as provided in the waivers.

The Legislature may, however, at any time

it thinks proper, withdraw that consent or change the conditions
and requirements of the consent.

See, e.g., Sikes v. Candler

County, 274 S.E.2d 464, 466 (Ga. 1981).

("A statutory waiver of

sovereign immunity, as a matter of grace could be granted, withdrawn, or restricted at the will of the Legislature."); Brown v.
Wichita State Univ., 547 P.2d 1015 (Kan. 1976) (held that even
where the court has abrogated

judicially-imposed

governmental

immunity, the Legislature has constitutional authority to reimpose it); and Morris v. South Carolina State Highway Dept.,
215 S.E.2d 430, 433 (S.C. 1975) ("We keep in mind the fact that
inasmuch as the right to sue is purely statutory, the Legislature has the power not only to restrict such right but to
withhold it, or withdraw it altogether".)

See, generally, 72

Am.Jur.2d States, §125.
The plain language of the 1984 amendment to §63-30-3
indicates that the Legislature intended to withdraw its consent
to the bringing of suits for injuries resulting from the management of flood waters and other natural disasters.
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The amendment

plainly states that "governmental entities and their officers
and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage
resulting from [flood management] activities."
Christensen

argues that the amendment was intended

only to include flood management activities within the category
of "governmental function."

Christensen, however, focuses only

on the first part of the amendment and ignores the second part.
The first part of the amendment provides that "[t]he managment
of flood waters and other natural disasters and the constructio,
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
entities are considered to be governmental function...".
the amendment stopped
some merit.

Had

there, Christensen's argument may have

The amendment continued, however, with language

clearly indicating a Legislative intent to withdraw consent for
suit arising from flood management activities.

The full amend-

ment is set forth below, as follows:
The management of flood waters and other
natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities are considered
to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and their officers and employees
are immune from suit for any injury or damage
resulting from those activities.
U.C.A. §63-30-3 (emphasis added).
The

language

of the

amendment

plainly

indicates a

legislative intent to provide immunity from suit to governmental
entities for injuries resulting from flood management activities.

The rules of statutory construction require the Court to
-13-

construe statutes "on the assumption that each term is used
advisedly and that the intent of the Legislature is revealed in
the use of the term in the context and structure in which it is
placed,"

Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984).

Applying that principle to the language of the 1984 amendment
leads to the conclusion that the Legislature intended to withdraw its consent to the bringing of suit for injury or damage
resulting from flood management activities.
This conclusion is further reinforced when the 1984
amendment

is considered

in the context of the circumstances

extant at the time of its passage.
experiencing

In 1983 and 1984, Utah was

some of the worst flooding of its history.

At

various locations throughout the state, including the one involved in this case, flood waters were threatening to inundate
portions

of

the

interstate

freeway.

Swollen

waterways and

saturated ground threatened, and in some circumstances caused,
substantial damage.

Emergency measures were required to mini-

mize the effects of the flooding.

The Legislature determined,

as a public policy matter, that in dealing with the drastic
circumstances created by the flooding situation, governmental
entities should be immune from suit so that they could address
the flooding problems without the restrictions which the fear of
liability suits might create.

While this Court might question

the wisdom of the Legislature's withdrawal of its consent to the
bringing

of suit

for

injury resulting

-14-

from flood

management

activities, the withdrawal of consent was a proper exercise of
the Legislative prerogative.

This Court should not substitute

its own judgment for that of the Legislature.
As mentioned above, Christensen argues that the Legislature's intent in enacting the 1984 amendment was simply to
include flood management activities as a governmental function
subject to the waivers contained in the Act.

Not only does that

argument ignore the second portion of the amendment affirmatively providing for immunity from suit for flood management activities, but it also renders the amendment superfluous and meaningless.

In enacting the 1984 amendment, the Legislature is pre-

sumed to be aware of court decisions interpreting the term "governmental function" found

in §63-30-3.

Theilken, 684 P.2d 709 (Wash. 1984).

See, e.g., State v.
(In construing legisla-

tion, the court presumes the legislature is familiar with past
judicial interpretations of its enactments.)

This Court has

construed the term "governmental function" to mean an activity
"of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a
governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of governmental activity."

Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605

P.2d 1230, 1236, 1237 (Utah 1980).

The Court later explained

that this test "does not refer to what government may do, but to
what government

alone must do."

Johnson v. Salt Lake City

Corp., 629 P.2d 432, 434 (Utah 1981).

-15-

(Emphasis in original).

There can be few clearer examples of a governmental
function, as construed
waters.

above, than

the management

of flood

The Legislature was aware, prior to the 1984 amendment,

that the management of flood waters constituted a governmental
function as that term was construed by the Court.

Enactment of

the 1984 amendment merely to declare the management of flood
waters and other natural disasters as a governmental function
would have been superfluous and meaningless.

This Court should

not presume that the Legislature enacted a meaningless statute.
See, e.g., City of Olathe v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 696 P.2d
409, 413 (Kan. App. 1985).
Legislature

does not intend

("There is a presumption that the
to enact useless or meaningless

legislation.")
Under Point II of its brief, Christensen suggests that
the acts complained of in this action do not really constitute
flood management activities.

Apart from the sheer absurdity of

that suggestion when considering the circumstances existing in
1983 and 1984, there is absolutely no evidence in the record to
support it.
verted

To the contrary, there is significant uncontro-

evidence

in the record

clearly establishing

that the

implementation of the dike project constitutes flood management
activities.

See, R., pp. 292-331.

Christensen also suggests that immunity should apply
only for damages resulting from "natural floods", and not for
damages resulting from "man-made floods" (Appellant's Brief, p.
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20).

This argument likewise has no logic.

If damages are

caused by a natural flood without any intervention by the State,
the State would have no possible liability and would have no
need of immunity.

On the other hand, under Christensen's argu-

ment the State would have no immunity from suit for damages
resulting from "man-made floods", which are the only ones where
the State might have liability and, therefore, the need for
immunity.

Christensen's argument simply makes no sense.

Finally, under Point I of its brief, Christensen cites
several cases in support of its proposition that immunity from
suit for injury resulting from flood management activities is
subject to the waivers of immunity contained in the Act.

None

of those cases, however, deals with either the management of
flood waters and other natural disasters or with the 1984 amendment to §63-30-3-

Those cases, therefore, have no bearing on

this case.

POINT II.
CHRISTENSENfS ARGUMENT REGARDING THE
ALLEGED IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION
OF CONTRACT WAS NOT RAISED IN THE
LOWER COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
BY THIS COURT. THAT ARGUMENT IS, IN
ANY EVENT, WITHOUT MERIT.
Under Point III of its brief, Christensen argues that
the 1984 amendment constitutes a law impairing the obligation of
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its contract with Provo City in violation of Article I, §18 of
the Constitution of Utah.

This argument was never raised at any

stage in the proceedings below and should not now be considered
by this Court on appeal.
It is axiomatic

that matters not presented

to the

trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Devel. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044
(Utah 1983)•

The burden is on the parties to make certain that

the record they compile will adequately preserve their arguments
for review in the event of an appeal. JEcL at p. 1045.

There is

no hint anywhere in the record that this issue was even suggested to the trial court.

Accordingly, under established rules

enunciated by this Court, this issue should not be considered.
Even if this issue is considered, Christensen1s argument is without merit.

The 1984 amendment does not affect the

rights and liabilities between the contracting parties, Provo
City and Christensen.

Christensenfs only rights affected, if

any, are its rights to recover in tort against an entity which
is not a party to the contract.

The 1984 amendment granting the

State immunity for injury resulting from the management of flood
waters cannot be any stretch of the imagination be deemed to
impair the obligation of the contract between Provo City and
Christensen.

Even if the Court reaches this issue, therefore,

the Court should reject Christensen's argument.

_1 A_

POINT III.
CHRISTENSENfS ARGUMENT REGARDING "TAKING
AND "DUE PROCESS" WAS NOT RAISED IN THE
LOWER COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
BY THIS COURT. THAT ARGUMENT IS, IN ANY
EVENT, WITHOUT MERIT.
Under Point IV of its brief, Christensen argues for
the first time that the 1984 amendment "poses constitutional
problems under the taking and due process clauses."

As with

Christensen1s argument regarding the impairment of the obligation of contracts, this argument is raised for the first time on
appeal.

It was not articulated in any form to the trial court.

As with the impairment of the obligation of contracts argument,
this argument should likewise not be considered.
Even

if

it

is

considered,

it

is

without

merit.

Christensen argues that the State's failure to remove the coffer
dams, which allegedly resulted in damage to Christensen, constitutes a deprivation of Christensenfs property without due process of law.

Christensen cites Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527

(1981) in support of that argument.

Parratt was a suit by an

inmate of a Nebraska prison seeking recovery of the value of
hobby materials which plaintiff claimed
negligently lost.

prison officials had

The Court concluded that plaintiff did not

allege a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and stated as follows:
To accept [plaintiff's] argument that the
conduct of the state officials in this case
constituted a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment would almost necessarily result in
turning every alleged injury which may have
-19-

been inflicted by a state official acting
under "color of law" into a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment cognizable under § 1983 •
It is hard to perceive any logical stopping
place to such a line of reasoning. Presumably, under this rationale, any party who is
involved in nothing more than an automobile
accident with a state official could allege a
constitutional violation under §1983.... We
do not think that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended the Amendment to
play such a role in our society.
Id. at p. 544.

Similarly, Christensen's

argument

that the

State's alleged failure to remove the coffer dams constitutes a
deprivation of property without due process is contrary to the
intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Additionally, Christensen appears to argue that the
State's alleged failure to remove the coffer dams constitues a
taking

of property

without

just compensation.

As indicated

above, the Court should not consider this issue which has been
raised for the first time on appeal.

If, however, the Court

considers this argument, the State, in an effort to avoid repetitious argument and to save the Court's time, responds by incorporating herein by reference the arguments set forth in the
supplemental briefs of respondents in the following cases currently on appeal before this Court and which were consolidated
for oral argument before this Court:
Diane Branam v. Provo School Dist., Case No. 20935;
and
Robert D. Irvine v. Salt Lake County, Case No. 21053.
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A copy of respondent's brief in each of these cases
has already been provided to counsel for the parties in this
case in connection with defendant State of Utah's Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion by Provo City to Reconsider State of Utah's
Summary Judgment Motion in the lower court.
POINT IV.
THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACT TO BE RESOLVED, AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE STATE WAS APPROPRIATE
Under Point V of its brief, Christensen argues that
genuine issues of material fact remain to be resolved precluding
summary judgment.

However, Christensen has failed to raise any

genuine issues of material fact remaining to be resolved.

The

lower court was correct in granting the State's motion for summary judgment.
Christensen claims that a fact issue remains as to
whether the acts of the State caused Christensen's damages.
purposes

of

this

appeal,

the

State

does

not

For

contest

Christensen's allegation that the State failed to remove the
coffer dams and that that failure caused Christensen's damages.
Christensen also claims a fact issue remains as to
whether the State's activities consituted "a flood-related governmental function" or a "man-made flood".

This does not raise

a fact issue, but merely presents a question of semantics in
describing the underlying undisputed facts.

Christensen next raises as a factual issue the question of whether the State's activities "were exempted from governmental immunity,"

That, however, is not a factual issue but

a legal issue.
Finally, Christensen claims a fact issue remains because the State disputes that the water on the east side of 1-15
remained

1' to 1 1/2' higher than the Utah Lake water level

until mid-September, when Christensen breached the coffer dams.
First, that factual issue is not material to the determination
of the issues in this case.

Second, the State will concede, for

purposes of this appeal, that the water on the east side of 1-15
remained 1' to 1 1/2' higher than the water level on the west
side of 1-15 until mid-September.

See, 1[ 12 under Statement of

Facts, above.
Christensen has failed to raise even one genuine issue
of material fact which would preclude summary judgment in favor
of

the

State.

The

uncontroverted

facts

establish

that

Christensen could not possibly have incurred any damage prior to
March 29, 1984, the effective date of the 1984 amendment.

The

interpretation of that amendment is purely a legal question.
There remains no issue of any material fact to be resolved in
order to determine, as a matter of law, that the State is entitled to summary judgment.
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POINT V.
STAKERfS ARGUMENT, RAISED FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL, SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED.
IN ANY EVENT, THE EXCEPTION TO
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FOR EQUITABLE CLAIMS
SHOULD NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE.
When the State filed its motion for summary judgment,
it sought summary judgment not only against the plaintiffs but
also against Staker as to Staker's cross-claim for contribution
and indemnity (R. pp. 180, 181, and 193).

At no time in the

lower court proceedings did Staker ever present any argument to
the lower court in opposition to the State's motion for summary
judgment.

The trial court never

had an opportunity to consider

and rule upon the argument now being presented by Staker for the
first time on appeal in its appellant's brief.

As stated above

as to Christensen's arguments raised for the first time on appeal, the Court should not consider Staker's argument raised for
the first time on appeal but should affirm the summary judgment
in favor of the State.
Even if the Court considers Staker's argument, the
Court should affirm the summary judgment in favor of the State.
In its brief, Staker argues that contribution and indemnity are
equitable claims and that the common law recognizes an exception
to governmental immunity for equitable claims.
cases in support of that proposition.

Staker cites two

Both cases were suits in

equity to prevent the State from obtaining a benefit to which it
was not entitled.
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In contrast to the two cases cited by Staker, Stakerfs
cross-claim against the State, while technically stating equitable claims, does not attempt to prevent the State from obtaining some benefit to which it is not entitled.

Staker's claims

for contribution and indemnity, if allowed, would permit Staker
to do in a cross-claim what it could not do in a direct action
as a plaintiff.

Such would be contrary to the intent and pur-

pose of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

The equitable
governmental

claims which

immunity should

be

create an exception to

limited

to those

situations

where a governmental entity is attempting to derive some benefit
it is not entitled to.

In that type of situation, equity would

demand that the plaintiff be entitled to sue and recover what in
equity does not belong to the State.

The exception should not

extend to every equitable claim simply because it is technically
an equitable claim.

Where that equitable claim is simply a

means to allow indirectly what the Governmental Immunity Act
would not allow directly, the exception should not apply.

See,

Phillips v. Union Pac. R.R. C o M 614 P.2d 153 (Utah 1980).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant
respectfully

requests the Court

State of Utah

to affirm the lower court's

-24-

granting

of

the

State's

motion

for

summary

judgment

as

Christensen's complaint and as to Staker's cross-claim.
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